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THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES
ACT MEETS ARBITRATION: NON-PARTIES
AND ARBITRATION
Richard M Alderman *
INTRODUCTION
has been written about the
decades, much
uring the past two
mandatory arbitration clauses
enforceability
of pre-dispute
contained in most consumer agreements.' Suffice it to say, the strong
federal presumption in favor of arbitration 2 has trumped almost every

D

* Associate Dean, Dwight Olds Chair in Law, and Director of the Center for
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Casey Holder and Melissa Gutierrez of the University of Houston Law Center, and
the staff of the Loyola Consumer Law Review for their editorial assistance.
' See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in
Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1237 (2001); Anne
Brafford, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: Fair Play or
Trap for the Weak and Unwary? 21 J. CoRP. L. 331 (1996); Frederick L. Miller,
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts; Building Barriers to Consumer

Protection, 78 MICH. B.J. 302 (1999); David S. Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration,

Set it Free: How "Mandatory" Arbitration Undermines "Arbitration,"8 NEV. L. J.
400 (2007); David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory
Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 5 (2004); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect
Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled
Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33 (1997); Richard E. Speidel, Consumer
Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute [Mandatory] Arbitration
Outlived its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069 (1998); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping
Mandatory Arbitration, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005); Jean R. Sternlight,
Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding
Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due
Process Concerns, 72 TuL. L. REv. 1 (1997).
2 "The Federal Arbitration Act reflects an emphatic federal policy in favor of
arbitral dispute resolution." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985); "The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of
federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration...." Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.

586

2012]

The FDCPA Meets Arbitration

587

claim that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") was not enacted to
apply to consumer contracts of adhesion, is unfair to consumers, or is
an ineffective method of redress. The Supreme Court recently held
that the FAA preempts even state unconscionability rules that
preclude arbitration provisions that prohibit collective redress or class
actions.3
Why, then, another article rehashing the same arguments only
to reach the same conclusion? Because a consumer's claim under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") 4 is different. All of
the recent Supreme Court decisions that have framed the
jurisprudence upholding the validity of consumer arbitration
provisions involve disputes between the parties to the arbitration
agreement-the business and the consumer.6 FDCPA claims, on the
other hand, by definition involve non-parties.6 The Act defines a debt
collector as:
any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate
commerce or the mails in any business the principal
purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who
regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or
indirectl,, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due
another.

Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
3 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), see discussion
infra Notes 82 to 92.
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 (1977).
See, e.g., CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012)
(agreement between credit card issuer and consumer); Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at
1740 (agreement between cellular phone service provider and customer); Rent-ACenter, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010) (employment contract
between employer and employee); Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552
U.S. 576, 581 (2008) (lease between landlord and tenant); Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006) (agreement between check cashing
company and customer); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003)
(agreement between finance company and customer); Volt Info. Scis., Inc., v. Bd.
of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (construction contract
between contractor and owner).
6 See, e.g., Thomas v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 2011 WL 3273477 (S.D.N.Y.
July 29, 2011) (bank collecting its own debts is not a debt collector under the
FDCPA).
' 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); In unusual cases, the creditor itself may fall within the
scope of the Act, "the term [debt collector] includes any creditor who, in the
process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would
indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts.
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In other words, debt collectors under the FDCPA will almost always
be a third party, removed from the consumer's agreement containing
the arbitration clause.
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that the FAA
sometimes authorizes non-parties to sometimes compel arbitration
pursuant to an otherwise enforceable agreement, claims against
"debt collectors" under the FDCPA raise unique issues that should
preclude the non-party debt collector from enforcing the agreement
between the creditor and the consumer. There are currently more than
300,000 debt collectors,9 collecting over $50 billion of debt'o from
approximately 30 million individuals," earning more than $10
billion.12 While many collectors fully comply with the law, the
vastness of the collection industry provides ample opportunity for
abuse.13 The FDCPA is designed to deter that abuse, compensate
aggrieved consumers, and provide a legal atmosphere within which
ethical collectors can successfully operate. This article examines the
arbitrability of FDCPA claims in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions. It considers whether the FDCPA's purpose,;"[t]o eliminate
abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that
Thomas, 2011 WL 3273477 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2011).
8 Arthur Anderson LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009).
9 Counting third-party collectors and creditors' in-house collectors together,
the accounts receivable management industry employs 302,000 collectors and is
expected to add 19 percent to staffing rolls between 2006 and 2018. Collections
Information, ACA INTERNATIONAL, http://www.acaintemational.org/productscollections-information-5431.aspx (last visited March 14, 2012) [hereinafter ACA
INTERNATIONAL].
10 Id. (Removing commission amounts from the total debt recovered leaves
more than $44.6 billion in debt that agencies returned on a commission basis to
creditors and the U.S. economy).
11FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD

at
available
2011),
(November
CREDIT
AND
DEBT
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/nationaleconomy/householdcredit/DistrictRe
port Q3201 1.pdf.
12In 2010, agencies recovered nearly $54.9 billion in total debt, on which they
earned $10.3

billion in commissions. ACA INTERNATIONAL,

supra note 9.

Although the amount of debt being collected has risen since 2007 to over $50
billion, the recession appears to have hurt the profitability of the debt collection
industry. See Patrick Lunsford, The Myth of the Debt Collection Boom, FORBES
(Feb. 23, 2012), availableat http://www.forbes.com/sites/insidearm/2012/02/23/the
-myth-of-the-debt-collection-boom/.
13 One source estimates that in 2010, there were more than 11,000 suits filed
under the FDCPA. See Matthew R. Bremner, The FairDebt Collection Practices
Act: The Need for reform in the Age of Financial Chaos, 76 BROOKLYN L. REV.
1553, at n.10 (2011).
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those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection
and to promote
practices are not competitively disadvantaged,
consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection
abuses,"l 4 justifies a different aulication of existing rules, or
requires an amendment to the FAA.
I. ARBITRATION AND NONPARTIES
Today, nearly every written agreement' 6 between a creditor
and a consumer contains a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreement that precludes either party from going to court, requiring
that disputes be settled in arbitration.' 7 In arbitration, the claim will
be resolved by a private "judge," who is not bound by most rules of
law or evidence, and with no jury or right of appeal. Consumer
14

15 U.S.C.

§ 1692(e). See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer &

Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605 (2010),
15 It should be noted that statutory claims, generally are subject to arbitration,
"unless overridden by a contrary congressional command." Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (RICO claim subject to arbitration).
There does not appear to be such a "congressional command" within the FDCPA.
See also CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) (CROA claim
subject to arbitration); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)
(ADEA claim subject to arbitration); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (Clayton Act claim subject to arbitration).
There does not appear to be sufficient grounds to hold that claims under the
FDCPA are not subject to an otherwise enforceable arbitration clause. See, e.g.,
Glasscock v. Cottonwood Financial, LTD., 2011 WL 4835677 (E.D. Tex. 2011)
(FDCPA contains no provision barring, prohibiting, or disfavoring arbitration of
claims).
16 The Federal Arbitration Act requires that agreements to arbitration must be
written. Section 2 of the Act provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
and
irrevocable,
valid,
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
17 In all likelihood, the note, mortgage, or deed of trust between a lender and
the consumer contains such an arbitration clause, as do most credit cards
agreements and installment contracts.
18 See, Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in
Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 761, 782-83 (2002) ("But arbitrators in most
cases are not bound to follow the law, nor are their decisions appealable to a court
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arbitration also generally will be more expensive than a trial in our
civil courts, and the decision likely will be unpublished, secret, and
not binding on any other arbitrator hearing an identical claim. Finally,
the arbitration clause also probably will ban the consumer from
joining or maintaining a class action.
There is little question that these pre-dispute consumer
arbitration agreements are binding "between the parties." There is a
division, however, regarding whether the arbitration clause is binding
on subsequent non-parties enforcing the agreement or being sued
for something that may have resulted from the agreement; in
particular, debt collectors.
While the FAA requires a written provision agreeing to
arbitrate, the definition of who is bound by its terms or entitled to
enforce the agreement has gradually been expanding to include a
wide range of non-parties. In Arthur Anderson LLP v. Carlisle, the
United States Supreme Court considered whether those who are not
parties to the written arbitration agreement are ineligible for relief
pursuant to that agreement based on the doctrine of equitable
estoppel.21 The Court emphasized that Section 2 of the FAA makes
of law for any but the most egregious of defects. Mere failure to follow the law is
not such a defect. The result is that whatever the rules of law may be, arbitrators are
not bound to follow them, and their handiwork is subject to only the most
perfunctory of judicial oversight. Arbitrators of course may choose to follow the
law - nothing requires them not to - but if they do, it's not because they have any
obligation to do so, and it's not something that a litigant or her attorney can count
on going in. Knowledgeable attorneys may have some sense of the approach that an
arbitration panel is likely to take to a given type of case. Still, the arbitrators bring
their own 'law' with them, and they take it with them when they leave."). See also
Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: PrivatizingLaw Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 720 n.82 (1999). But see Christopher R.
Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 187, 189 (2006) (the
author concludes that "the available empirical evidence to date provides at best
weak support for the view that arbitration is 'lawless."').
19 As discussed at notes 82 to 92, the Supreme Court's recent decision in
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), upholding class action
waivers, will most likely have the practical effect of encouraging all creditors to
include such waivers as part of their arbitration provision.
20 As discussed in the text, the FAA requires a written agreement to arbitrate.
See 9 U.S.C. § 2. There is no requirement, however, that the parties sign the
agreement. The terms "non-parties" and "non-signatories" will both be used to
indicate entities who are not parties to the agreement, with non-signatories used
when the agreement is, in fact, signed by the parties.
21 Arthur Andersen LLP v. Wayne Carlisle, et. al., 556 U.S. 624 (2009). See
generally Nima H. Mohebbi, Back DoorArbitration: Why Allowing Nonsignatories
to Unfairly Utilize Arbitration Clauses May Violate the Seventh Amendment, 12 U.
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written arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of a contract."2 "That provision creates substantive federal law
regarding the enforceability of arbitration agreements, requiring
courts 'to lace such agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts."'
Relying on the Act's mandate that arbitration
agreements are to be interpreted and tested pursuant to state law, the
Court took what it saw as the next logical step, concluding that
questions regarding who may enforce an arbitration clause should
also be determined by state law:
Because "traditional principles" of state law allow a contract
to be enforced by or against nonparties to the contract
through "assumption, piercing the corporate veil, alter ego,
incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary
theories, 24 waiver and estoppel," the Sixth Circuit's holding
that nonparties to a contract are categorically barred from
Section 3 relief was error.25
Thus, the Court held that when a non-party attempts to enforce an
arbitration provision pursuant to Section 3 of the FAA, the decision
must be based on generally applicable relevant state law, 2 6 including
PA. J. BUS. L. 555 (2010).
22 Carlisle, 129 S. Ct.
at 1901.
23 Id. (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc., v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
24 Third party beneficiary theories will seldom be applicable in the context of a
debt collector collecting a debt. To qualify as a third party beneficiary, it is
necessary to show the parties intended to create a benefit for the third party. See,
e.g., Fox v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 2010 WL 3420172 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2010)
(In the case at bar, NCI is asserting the benefit of the arbitration agreement without
showing where Plaintiff, as one of the contracting parties, intended to confer any
"separate and distinct benefit" on NCI or other third-party debt collectors.)
25 Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. at 1902. In a footnote, the Court also noted that federal
law requires that "questions of arbitrability . . . be addressed with a healthy regard

for the federal policy favoring arbitration." Id. at n. 5 (citing Moses H. Cone
Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).)
26 Carlisle requires that the court apply "relevant state contract law" when
determining whether a non-party may enforce an arbitration provision. Carlisle,
129 S. Ct. at 1902. Prior to Carlisle, most federal circuit courts faced with the
question of to what extent a non-party is bound by an arbitration provision
contained in a contract she is suing under had applied the federal substantive law of
arbitrability to resolve the issue. See, e.g., Dominium Austin Partners, L.L.C. v.
Emerson, 248 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2001); Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency L.L.C.,
210 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2000); Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen &
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the doctrine of equitable estoppel.27
Today, courts routinely use "traditional principles" of state
law to expand the scope of an arbitration agreement beyond the
parties to the agreement. Specifically, courts find (1) agreements
incorporated by reference, (2) assignments and assumption, (3) veil
piercing/alter ego, (4) estoppel, and (5) agency.28 In the case of a
consumer and a debt collector, enforceability of an arbitration clause
appears to depend primarily on the language of the agreement and the
nature of the relationship between the debt collector and the creditor.
A. Debt Collector as AppropriateNon-party
Although courts uniformly recognize a strong federal policy
favoring consumer arbitration, arbitration remains a matter of
agreement. 29 In other words, there must be an enforceable agreement
and it must cover the dispute at issue. "A party cannot be required to
submit to arbitration any dispute which [it] has not agreed so to
submit." 30 Two issues arise when applying the law to a debt collector
under the FDCPA. First, does the dispute in question fall within the
scope of that arbitration agreement? Second, and more importantly, is
the clause enforceable by or against the debt collector, who is a nonparty to the original agreement?
Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2000); Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am.
Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1995); Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist
Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753 (11th Cir. 1993); Hughes Masonry Co., Inc. v. Greater
Clark County Sch. Bldg. Corp., 659 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1981). Carlisle makes it
clear that the decision to enforce an arbitration clause must be based on state law.
Although this is a shift in focus, the author does not believe it will have a major
substantive effect. In most cases, the federal substantive law applied in this area, is
consistent with the appropriate state law. See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Fin. Group, LLC v.
Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 268 (5th Cir. 2004), wherein the court applied federal
substantive law, but stated, "we also note there is no reason to think Mississippi
law would compel a different result in this case." See also Kettles v. Rent-Way,
Inc., 2009 WL 1406670 (W.D. Mich. May 18, 2009) (court must apply Michigan
state law).
27 Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. at 1904 (Souter, J., dissenting) (joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Stevens dissented, stating that section 3 should be read as
offering a stay only to signatories of an arbitration agreement).
28 See, e.g., Thomson-CSF v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir.
1995) ("A non-signatory party may be bound to an arbitration agreement if so
dictated by the "ordinary principles of contract and agency."') (citing McAllister
Bros., Inc. v. A & S Transp. Co., 621 F.2d 519, 524 (2d Cir. 1980)).
29 See generally, supra
note 2.
30 AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475
U.S. 643, 648
(1986).
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In the vast majority of cases involving claims under the
FDCPA, the arbitration agreement in question clearly covers the
dispute if it arises between the parties to the contract. Most arbitration
clauses contain language stating something to the effect that the
clause applies to any and all claims related to, resulting from, or
arising out of the agreement.3 1 Thus, all disputes between the parties
to the afreement (the consumer and the creditor), including statutory
claims, generally are covered by the arbitration agreement. The
issue then is whether the arbitration clause applies to a non-party debt
collector. The courts have recognized that the most direct way of
resolving this question is to review the language of the arbitration
provision itself.
B. Languageof the Agreement
As indicated above, arbitration is a matter of agreement, and
the scope and applicability of the arbitration provision depends on the
language of that agreement. For example, in Sherer v. Green Tree
Servicing LLC,34 a FDCPA claim was brought against a non-party
loan servicer who moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the loan
agreement. The arbitration clause at issue stated it applied to any
claims arisin from "the relationships which result from th[e]
[a]greement." 5 The court concluded that a loan servicer is just such a
"relationship," because without the Loan Agreement, there would be
For example, in the most recent consumer arbitration decision of the
Supreme Court, the clause in questions read: "Any claim, dispute or controversy
(whether in contract, tort, or otherwise) at any time arising from or relating to your
Account, any transferred balances or this Agreement (Collectively, 'Claims'), upon
the election of you or us, will be resolved by binding arbitration...." See
Compucredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 668 (2012).
32 Statutory claims are subject to arbitration "unless overridden by a contrary
congressional command." See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 226 (1987) (RICO claim subject to arbitration); see also CompuCredit Corp.
v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 667 (2012) (CROA claim subject to arbitration);
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (ADEA claim subject
to arbitration); and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 639-40 (1985) (Clayton Act claim subject to arbitration).
3 For example, in In re Rubiola, the Texas Supreme Court noted that
"although "[a]rbitration agreements apply to nonsignatories only in rare
circumstances[,]" the question of "[w]ho is actually bound by an arbitration
agreement is [ultimately] a function of the intent of the parties, as expressed in the
terms of the agreement." 334 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Tex. 2011) (citing Bridas
S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 355, 358 (5th Cir. 2003)).
34 Sherer v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC., 548 F.3d 379, 380 (5th Cir. 2008).
3

35

d
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no loan for Green Tree to service, and "no party argues to the
contrary."36 Therefore the consumer expressly agreed to arbitrate
with a non-signatory. 37, Similarly, a FDCPA claim against an attorney
was subject to an arbitration clause between the consumer and the
creditor, which stated it extended to "the benefit of any third party
named as a co-defendant." 38
On the other hand, in Bontempo v. Wolpoff & Abramson, the
court decided the arbitration clause language did not encompass a
claim against a debt collector. 39 The specific contract language
required that for a claim against a debt collector to be subject to the
arbitration provision, the creditor had to be joined as a codefendant.4 0 Although another provision broadly defined the scope of
the agreement to arguably include the debt collector, the court held
that the more specific provision that expressly included the term debt
collector applied.4 1
Id. at 382; see also Homicek v. Cardworks Servicing, LLC., No. 10-3631,
2011 WL 2623274, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2011) (arbitration agreement expressly
included any party servicing the loan).
3 See also Wilson v. Cash America Int'l, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-42 1-A, 2012 WL
310936, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb 1, 2012) (arbitration agreement expressly applied to
parent company, affiliates and related third parties, which included the debt
collectors); Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 400 F.3d 1308, 1312 (11th Cir.
2005) (non-signatory could compel arbitration because "[t]he scope of the [n]ote's
arbitration clause is sufficiently broad to allow non-signatories to invoke the clause
where, as here, they face claims derived from the [n]ote."); Hormicek v. Cardworks
Servicing, LLC, No. 10-3631, 2011 WL 2623274, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2011)
("This claim falls squarely within the terms of the arbitration provision, which
states, in relevant part, that '[a]ny disputes arising from the collection of amounts
you owe in connection with your [a]ccount' will be subject to arbitration"); In re
Rubiola 334 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Tex. 2011) ("The arbitration agreement, however,
expressly provides that certain non-signatories are to be parties to the agreement.").
38 Passmore v. Discover Bank, No. 1:11-CV-01347, 2011 WL 5086431, at *6
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 2011). In light of the language of the agreement in Passmore,
the arbitration agreement most likely would not be enforceable by the third party if
he was sued individually, not named as a co-defendant of the creditor. See also
O'Fallon v. Encore Receivable Management, Inc., No. 2:1 1-CV-36-KS-MTP,
2011 WL 6762928, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 3, 2011) (arbitration clause applied to
third parties joined as co-defendants).
Bontempo v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP., No. 06-745, 2006 WL 3040905,
at *5-8 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2008). The court also rejected claims based on agency
and equitable estoppel.
40 Id. See also Cohen v. Wolpoff & Ambramson, No. 08-1084 (SRC), 2008
U.S. LEXIS 77052, at *8 (D. N. J. Oct. 1, 2008); Kamett v.Wolpoff & Abramson,
L.L.P., 444 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (E.D. Va. 2006).
41 Bontempo, 2006 WL 3040905, at *5-8.
36
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Other courts have similarly denied arbitration when the
contract language that expressly defines claims subect to arbitration
does not include a claim against the debt collector. For example, in
Lucy v. Bay Area Credit SVC LLC, the court denied a debt collector's
motion to compel arbitration based on the language of the agreement
between Lucy and AT&T.4 3 The agreement stated that Lucy and
AT&T agreed to arbitrate "all disputes and claims between us[,]"
where "[r]eferences to ... 'us' include our respective subsidiaries,

affiliates, agents, employees, predecessors in interest, successors, and
assigns ... .

Bay Area Credit argued that it acted as AT&T's

"agent" for purposes of collection, and could invoke the arbitration
agreement. AT&T, however, had previously entered into a Collection
Agency Services Agreement (CSA) with Bay Area Credit that
specified that the defendant was to perform as "an independent
contractor and not as an agent or an employee ..."45 Thus, the court
found that the terms of the Collection Agreement precluded an
agency relationship between Bay Area Credit and AT&T.4 6
C. Non-parties:Agency andEquitableEstoppel
As noted above, the Supreme Court has recognized that
agency and equitable estoppel may form the basis for enforcing an
arbitration agreement upon a non-party.4 7 The first step in
determining if a debt collector may enforce an arbitration provision is
whether the collector is an "agent":
An agent has power to make contracts which will bind his
principal not only when actually authorized to do so by
express words or inference of fact, but also in cases where
the principal did not intend to confer such authority on the
agent but, nevertheless, held out to the public or to the
See Mims v. Global Credit & Collection Corp., 803 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 135255 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (agreement covered agent of creditor, however, debt collector
was not an agent); Fox v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., No. 06-745, 2010 WL 3420172,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2010) (agreement specified express parties to the
agreement and did not include debt collector).
43 Lucy v. Bay Area Credit SVC LLC, 792 F. Supp. 2d 320, 328 (D. Conn.
2011).
4 Bay Area Credit, 792 F. Supp. 2d.at 322 (emphasis added).
42

45

id.

Id. at 325. In most cases, debt collectors act as independent contractors, not
agents. Note that the court also refused to enforce the agreement based on
principles of estoppel.
47 Arthur Anderson LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 1896, 1902 (2009).
46
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person with whom the agent dealt an appearance of
authority. An agency relationship is formed when each of
two parties agree that one of the parties (the agent) will act
on behalf of and be subject to the control of the other party
(the principal). The agency exception exists when ...the
relationship between the signatory and
. nonsignatory
defendants is sufficiently close that only by permitting the
nonsignatory to invoke arbitration may evisceration of the
underlying arbitration agreement between the signatories be
avoided.
In most cases, agency will not be an applicable basis for
including non-party debt collectors within the scope of an arbitration
clause. Creditors do not want to create an agency relationship with a
debt collector. Instead, they prefer to either sell the obligation
outright, or, allow the debt collector to work as an independent
contractor. Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, is the most
common argument used by non-parties as the basis for enforcing an
arbitration provision.
For example, in Bay Area Credit, the court followed the
Second Circuit's rules regarding estoppel:
Bay Area Credit maintains that even if it is not AT&T's
agent, it may compel arbitration against Lucy "under the
common law contract principle of equitable estoppel."
Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, "a non-signatory to
an arbitration agreement may compel a signatory to that
agreement to arbitrate a dispute where a careful review of
the relationship among the parties, the contracts they signed
... and the issues that had arisen among them discloses that
the issues the non-signatory is seeking to resolve in
arbitration are intertwined with the agreement that the
estopped party has signed."49
The court in Bay Area Credit followed what it describes as the
"Second Circuit's" rules regarding estoppel. Prior to the decision in
Carlisle, many federal courts held that the principles of equitable
estoppel were a matter of federal law to be determined by the court.
Frank

Z.

LaForge,

Note: Inequitable Estoppel: Arbitrating with
Nonsignatory Defendants Under Grigson v. Creative Artists, 84 TEXAS L. REV.
225, 230 (2005).
49 Bay Area Credit, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 325 (citing Ragone v. Atlantic Video at
the Manhattan Ctr., 595 F.3d 115, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2010)).
48
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For example, in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the courts used an
"intertwined claims" standard. This standard allowed a non-signatory
to compel arbitration under two different scenarios:
First, equitable estoppel applies when the signatory to a
written agreement containing an arbitration clause must rely
on the terms of the written agreement in asserting its claims
against the nonsignatory. When each of a signatory's claims
against a nonsignatory makes reference to or presumes the
existence of the written agreement, the signatory's claims
arise out of and relate directly to the written agreement, and
arbitration is appropriate. Second, application of equitable
estoppel is warranted when the signatory to the contract
containing an arbitration clause raises allegations of
substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by
both the nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to
the contract. Otherwise the arbitration proceedings between
the two signatories would be rendered meaningless and the
federal policy in favor of arbitration effectively thwarted.o
Carlise, however, makes it clear that courts must look to state law to
establish the doctrine of equitable estoppel. This change in focus may
not have a substantive effect," but should require courts to more
carefully review state law doctrine rather than Circuit rules.
Although many courts use equitable estoppel to find that
claims by or against a debt collector are subject to an arbitration
provisions included in the original contract, some courts find the
relationship between the debt collector and the creditor/consumer too
tenuous to impose arbitration.
For example, in Butto v. Collecto Inc.,52 plaintiffs Victoria
Butto and Lakesha Houser entered into cell phone service contracts
with Verizon and AT&T. Both Butto and Houser failed to pay their
cell phone bills and their services were cancelled. Pursuant to
standing collection agreements with the defendant Collecto, each
asked Collecto to collect the overdue charges. Although Collecto had
no contractual relationship with either plaintiff, it argued that both
were bound to arbitrate based upon. the agreements they entered into
5o MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999)
(citing Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679, 681 (5th Cir.
1976)); see also Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 527 (5th
Cir. 2000).
51 See supra note 26.
52 Butto v. Collecto Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 443,
445 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
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with Verizon and AT&T.
The court disagreed, noting, "[t]he party seeking to compel
arbitration has the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the
evidence the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. 5 3 In other words,
Collecto had the burden of showing that it may enforce the arbitration
provisions set forth in the plaintiffs' service agreements when
Collecto was not a party to those contracts. The Second Circuit's
recognition that a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement may be
deemed a party to that arbitration agreement accordingly favored
Collecto.54 The court reviewed the methods by which a non-party
may enforce an arbitration provision.5 5 It identified agency and
estoppel as relevant doctrines, but no others. Because it found that
estoppel incorporated agency, the court considered whether Butto and
Houser were estopped from denying the enforceability of the
arbitration provision.
The court concluded that to establish estoppel, Collecto must
satisfy a two part test: first, that there are "intertwined factual issues"
between the claims asserted and the agreement containing the
arbitration clause; and second, that there is "a relationship among the
parties of a nature that justifies a conclusion that the party which
agreed to arbitrate with another entity should be estopped from
denying an obligation to arbitrate a similar dispute with the adversary
which is not a party to the arbitration agreement." 56 As the court
noted, Collecto clearly met the first test because the claims it was
asserting were intertwined with the service agreements signed by
Butto and Houser.5 7 Under the second prong, however, the court
" Id. at 446.
54 See also Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P'ship, Inc. v. Smith Cogeneration
Int'l, Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 97 (2d Cir. 1999) ("In this circuit, we have repeatedly
found that non-signatories to an arbitration agreement may nevertheless be bound
according to ordinary principles of contract and agency") (citing McAllister Bros.
Inc. v. A & S Transp. Co., 621 F.2d 519, 524 (2d Cir. 1980)); see also Deloitte
Noraudit A/S v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, U.S., 9 F.3d 1060, 1064 (2d Cir. 1993). .
ss An arbitration agreement may be enforceable by a non-signatory based on
principles of "(1) incorporation by reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency; (4) veilpiercing/alter ego; and (5) estoppel." Sokol Holdings, Inc. v. BMB Munai, Inc., 542
F.3d 354, 359 (2d Cir. 2008). See also Smith/Enron, 198 F.3d at 97 ("An arbitration
agreement may be enforceable by a non-signatory based on principles of "(1)
incorporation by reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency; (4) veil-piercing/alter ego;
and (5) estoppel.").
56 Butto, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
5 In the Court's view, the arbitration provisions in both agreements are
broadly drafted, and would apply to most, if not all, legal disputes between (1)
Butto and Verizon and (2) Houser and AT&T. In addition, while Collecto is not
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would not enforce the arbitration provision after concluding that
Verizon, AT&T, and Collecto had an insufficient relationship to
support such enforcement. . Although Collecto argued that it was an
agent of the service providers, the court relied on the terms of
Collecto's agreement to find otherwise. The agreement stated:
In providing any Services under this Agreement, [Collecto]
is acting solely as an independent contractor and not as an
agent of any other party. Persons furnished by [Collecto]
shall be solely the employees or agents of [Collecto] and
shall be under the sole and exclusive direction and control of
[Collecto] .... Neither Party undertakes by this Agreement

or
liability
any
or otherwise to perform or discharge
obligation of the other party, whether regulatory or
contractual, or to assume any responsibility whatsoever for
the conduct of the business or operations of the other Party.
Nothing contained in this Agreement is intended to give rise
to a partnership or joint venture between the Parties or to
impose upon the Parties any of the duties or responsibilities
of partners or joint venturers.
Based primarily on this agreement, the court stated, "the disavowal of
both agency and control in the collection agreements nullifies
Collecto's assertion that these agreements could form the basis for
finding that an agency relationship existed."5
Other courts have also refused to allow a debt collector to
impose arbitration based on a theory of equitable estopped.5 9
mentioned in either agreement, the validity of the collection fees that Collecto
attempted to levy on both plaintiffs will likely implicate those service agreements.
This is particularly true with respect to the Verizon agreement, as that contract
expressly mentions Verizon right to recover collection fees. Thus, the plaintiffs'
claims against Collecto are almost certainly "intertwined" with the service
agreements, and as such, the first prong of the two-part test is satisfied.
s8 Compare Butto, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 449, with Morante v. Am. Gen. Fin. Ctr.,
157 F.3d 1006, 1009-10 (5th Cir. 1998), where the court found an agency
relationship, notwithstanding an agreement designating the collector as an
independent. The court noted that an agreement describing a party as an
independent agent is not conclusive; the key inquiry is the right of control the
creditor exercised over the collection agency's day-to-day activities. Id. at 1009-10.
59 Fox v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 2010 WL 3420172 at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25,
2010) ("Equitable estoppel applies when the signatory 'must rely on the terms of
the written agreement in asserting its claim' against a non-signatory party . ...
Here, Plaintiffs claim is not based on the terms of her cardholder contract. Plaintiff
alleges only that NCI violated the FDCPA . . . ").
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II. FDCPA CLAIMS SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO
ARBITRATION
The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the validity and
enforceability of arbitration provisions in consumer contracts. It held
that a class action is inconsistent with the FAA. It held that nonparties may enforce an arbitration agreement. However, these
decisions should not be extended to claims arising under the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). As noted .above, statutory
FDCPA claims arise between the consumer and a non-party debt
collector. They involve policy considerations different from those
that arise when determining the validity and enforceability of
agreement between immediate parties or between non-parties
involved in other situations. The structure of the FDCPA and the
nature of litigation pursuant to the Act mitigate against extending an
otherwise valid arbitration provision to a non-party debt collector.
A. The FDCPA Needs the Courts
In 1977, Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.6 0 The reasons for its enactment were clearly spelled out in the
Congressional findings and declaration of purpose:
(a) There is abundant evidence of the use of abusive,
deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many
debt collectors. Abusive debt collection practices contribute
to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital
instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual
privacy.
(b) Existing laws and procedures for redressing these
injuries are inadequate to protect consumers.
(c) Means other than misrepresentation or other
abusive debt collection practices are available for the
effective collection of debts.
(d) Abusive debt collection practices are carried on to
a substantial extent in interstate commerce and through
means and instrumentalities of such commerce. Even where
abusive debt collection practices are purely intrastate in
character, they nevertheless directly affect interstate
commerce.
(e) It is the purpose of this title to eliminate abusive
60

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (1977).
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debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that
those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt
collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged,
and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers
against debt collection abuses. 6 1
It is significant to note that FDCPA was not enacted to
provide a national police force for the debt collection industry.62 It
did not create a substantial public enforcement mechanism through
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). The FDCPA is "selfenforced." Primarily through private litigation, the FDCPA promotes
consistent State action. The FTC recognizes that public enforcement
plays a minor role under the FDCPA. Its 2009 Report, COLLECTING
CONSUMER DEBTS: THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE, stated: "The
FDCPA was intended to be and should be primarily a self-enforcing
statute. Thus, private action rather than government law enforcement
should be the main means of promoting industry compliance with the
law."63
15 U.S.C. § 1692.
See Defining Larger Participants in Certain Consumer Financial Product and
Service Markets, 77 FR. 9592-01 (proposed February 17, 2012) (to be codified at
12 CFR pt. 1090), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2012/02/20120216_cfpbarger-participants-NPRM-assubmitted.pdf. After completion of this article, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau announced a proposal to regulate larger debt collection firms. The Bureau
has the authority under the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 to supervise
any "larger participant of a market for other consumer financial products or
services," as defined by rule by the Bureau. The Proposed Rule would establish the
initial larger participant rule for two markets: consumer debt collection and
consumer reporting. The proposed threshold for the consumer debt collection
market is more than $10 million in annual receipts. The Bureau estimates that this
threshold would likely bring within the Bureau's scope of supervision
approximately 175 entities out of approximately 4,500 firms engaged in debt
collection, about 4% of the firms. Under the proposal, the Bureau will be
authorized to supervise larger debt collectors by requiring the submission of reports
and conducting examinations to: (1) assess compliance with Federal consumer
financial law; (2) obtain information about such persons' activities and compliance
systems or procedures; and (3) detect and assess risks to consumers and to the
consumer financial markets. It is difficult to say exactly what the role of the Bureau
will be, but it is clear that 96% of debt collectors will not be subject to the Rule,
and the FDCPA will remain the primary means of dealing with collection abuse.
63 See Fed. Trade Comm'n, COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS: THE CHALLENGES
available at
2009),
A WORKSHOP REPORT (FEB.
CHANGE,
OF
of
number
The
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/debtcollection/dcwr.pdf.
Commission enforcement actions is consistent with this observation. Between 1977
61
62
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The "private action" referred to by the FTC is private civil
litigation, resulting in public decisions that create binding precedent
and consistency. Our civil justice system provides the perfect setting
for the FDCPA, allowing for compensation to injured consumers as
well as direction to debt collectors. 64 Judges are able protect
individual consumers and rovide guidance for others who might
engage in similar activities. sA significant purpose of the Act is to
eliminate abusive practices by debt collectors and "to insure that
those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection
practices are not competitively disadvantaged." 6 6
For example, in Bartlett v. Heibl,67 Judge Posner, appellate
judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
did more than simply resolve a dispute between an attorney and a
consumer under the Act when he noted,
So the judgment must be reversed. But we should not stop
here. Judges too often tell defendants what the defendants
cannot do without indicating what they can do, thus
engendering legal uncertainty that foments further
litigation. 68
Judge Posner then proposed a "safe harbor" letter for debt
collectors who want to avoid the problem faced by Heibl. 6 This is
the type of private action and result expected pursuant to the
and 2008, the FTC filed only 67 debt collection related cases. (Report Appendix
B).
64 See generally Richard M. Alderman, Why We Really Need the Arbitration
FairnessAct: It's All About Separation of Powers, 12 J. CONSUMER AND COMM. L.
151 (2009).
65 FED. TRADE. COMM'N, STAFF COMMENTARY
ACT,
PRACTICES
COLLECTION

ON THE FAIR DEBT
at
available

http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fdcpa/commentary.shtm (last visited Feb. 10, 2012):
The Federal Trade Commission may also interpret the FDCPA through the issuance
of staff commentary. As the Commission notes, however, interpretations are a
"guideline intended to clarify the staff interpretations of the statute, but does not
have the force or effect of statutory provisions. It is not a formal trade regulation
rule or advisory opinion of the Commission, and thus is not binding on the
Commission or the public." Court opinions interpreting the Act, on the other hand,
do have the force of law, and are binding on all lower courts. As of July 21, 2011,
only the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") can issue guidelines
(such as the FTC Staff Commentary) relating to the FDCPA.
66 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).
67 Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir.
1997).
68
69

Id.
Id.
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FDCPA.7 0
The opinion in Heibl is a good example of how the FDCPA
should work. an excellent example of what is impossible in
arbitration. If the contract in Heibl contained an arbitration clause
enforceable by the collector, the arbitrator could not accomplish what
Judge Posner did. The arbitrator could only rule that the attorney had
violated the FDCPA and award compensation and attorneys' fees.
Arbitrators usually do not issue written opinions. When they do, the
opinions are often secret. More importantly, no opinion of an
arbitrator has precedential value. Unlike Judge Posner, an arbitrator
could not establish a "safe-harbor." Other collectors would have no
way of knowing how to avoid future liability. To the extent the
FDCPA is premised on the belief that private litigation can produce
consistent rules and guidance to those engaged in the business of
collecting
debts, widespread
arbitration. would
frustrate
Congressional intent.
Court opinions are also necessary to ensure that the
interpretations of the FDCPA are consistent72 and to accommodate
Christian

Stuben,

Judge of Jury? Determining Deception or
Misrepresentation Under the FairDebt Collection PracticesAct, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3107 (2010) (policy considerations of FDCPA favor a consistent approach
and judge made decisions).
' For example, in a recent article, the author reviews inconsistencies in the
application of the FDCPA and concludes, "Courts, attorneys, and debt collectors
alike need to clearly and consistently apply the existing statutory definitions of
creditor and debt collector in the FDCPA." Young Walgenkim, Killing "Zombie
Debt" Through Clarity and Consistency in the FairDebt Collection PracticesAct,
24 LoY. CONSUMER L. REv. 65, 91 (2011). Only through litigation and judicial
opinions can that consistency be achieved. Increased use of arbitration will serve to
simply perpetuate the inconsistent application of the FDCPA discussed in the
article, leaving debt collectors and consumers unsure of the their rights and
liabilities. See also Eric M. Marshall, Note, The Protective Scope of the FairDebt
Collection PracticesAct: ProvidingMortgagors the Protection They Deserve From
Abusive Foreclosure Practices, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1269 (2010) (arguing for a
consistent application of the FDCPA to claims arising out of a foreclosure); Andrea
M. Bergia, No Shelter From the Storm: Dangersfrom the Fair Debt Collection
PracticesAct to Mortgage Industry Attorneys and a Callfor Legislative Action, 29
THE REV. OF LIT. 391 (2010) (courts should be mindful of policy goals
underpinning the FDCPA and avoid making attorneys who represent the mortgage
industry sacrificial lambs).
72 Excessive use of arbitration, a likely result if such clauses are enforceable
and easy to draft, will have the effect of preventing the Supreme Court from
resolving circuit differences. For example, in Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini,
Kramer & Ulrich LPA, the Court resolved a conflict regarding whether the
FDCPA's bona fide error defense applied to mistake of law. 130 S. Ct. 1605
70
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new technologies and innovative collection practices. As with any
statute, interpretation conflicts among courts can arise.7 3 As debt
collectors switch from letters and phone calls to email and
"Tweeting," the Act must be interpreted to accommodate new and
innovative methods of collection. Change can come from the
cumbersome and often-contentious legislative amendment process,
but it can also come from the courts.74
The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from making false,
deceptive, or misleading representations. Unlike common law and
other consumer statutes, 7 violations of the FDCPA are actionable
under a strict liability theory.76 Statutory damages or injunctive relief
may be recovered without a showing of reliance by the consumer or
actual damages.77 Thus, individual issues that often predominate
(2010).
7 See Darren W. Ford, Secondary Liability Under the FairDebt Collection
Practices Act, 78 U. CINN. L. REV 1079 (2010) (discussing the split of authority
regarding the extent of FDCPA liability). Compare Schwarm v. Craighead, 552 F.
Supp. 2d 1056 (E.D. Cal. 2008), with Kistner v. Law Offices of Michael P.
Margelefsky, LLC., 518 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2008).
74 Colin Hector, Debt Collection in the Information Age: New Technologies
and the FairDebt Collection PracticesAct, 99 CAL. L. REv. 1601 (2011).
7 See, e.g., Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Texas Bus. & Com. Code
§17.50 (a) (requiring reliance by a consumer, and authorizes additional statutory
damages only if other damages are awarded).
76 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (1977). To recover
damages under the FDCPA, the consumer does not have to show intentional
conduct on the part of the debt collection. The degree of a defendant's culpability
goes only to damages. See id. [Hereinafter Civil Liability]; see, e.g., Allen v.
LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364 (3d Cir. 2011); Ellis v. Solomon & Solomon,
P.C., 591 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2010).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. A court may award statutory damages, subject to a
cap of $1,000 for individual actions, or, for class actions, "the lesser of $500,000 or
1 per centum of the net worth of the debt collector." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2). In
awarding additional damages, the court must consider "the frequency and
persistence of [the debt collector's] noncompliance," "the nature of such
noncompliance," and "the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional."
§1692k(b). The FDCPA permits the recovery of statutory damages without a
finding of any actual damages. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Arrow Financial Services,
LLC., 660 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2011); Robey v. Shapiro, Marianos & Cejda, L.L.C.,
434 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2008); Miller V. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d
307 (2d Cir. 2003).
As this article was being written, the Supreme Court was considering First
American Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, which raises the issue of whether Article III §2 of
the Constitution confers standing without an allegation of actual harm. Depending
on the outcome in Edwards, the FDCPA "strict liability" provisions may not be
enforceable in federal court. For a discussion of Edwards, see SCOTUS BLOG,
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other discussions of deception or falsity are not applicable to claims
under the FDCPA. A court faced with a practice that is alleged to be
false or deceptive under the FDCPA may rule based on its objective
evaluation of the potential of the practice to mislead or deceive
consumers generally. This allows for wider, more informative
rulings that further consistency and reliance by consumers and debt
collectors.
The FDCPA was expressly designed for adjustments by the
courts to deal with new or unforeseeable acts and practices. When it
was enacted more than thirty years ago, Congress attempted to
prohibit those practices it identified as wrongful. It recognized that it
could not predict how the debt collection industry might change.
For example, the "False or Misleading Representations" section
of the FDCPA is just one example of how the Act gives courts the
necessary flexibility. This section states that a debt collector may not
use any "false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in

http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/first-american-financial-corp-vedwards, (last visited February 24, 2012).
78 The standard used to evaluate the alleged false or deceptive
act is not a
reasonable consumer or the plaintiff. In many jurisdictions, the court employees a
"least sophisticated" consumer test. See, e.g., Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d
450 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying least sophisticated consumer test to letter); Swanson
v. S. Or. Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1226-30 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopting the
least sophisticated debtor standard in a case relating to FDCPA claims); Kistner v.
Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC, 518 F.3d 433 (recognizing that the
least sophisticated consumer test is an objective test); Jeter v. Credit Bureau, 760
F.2d 1168, 1175 (11th Cir. 1985) (adopting the least sophisticated consumer
standard in addressing FDCPA claims). As the Second Circuit observed, "[t]he
basic purpose of the least-sophisticated consumer standard is to ensure that the
FDCPA protects all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd. This standard is
consistent with the norms that court shave traditionally applied in consumerprotection law." Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993).
It should be noted that the "least sophisticated consumer" test is often replaced
with what is viewed as a more reasonable test, the "unsophisticated consumer" test.
As the court explained in Gammon v. GC Servs. L.P., 27 F.3d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir.
1994),
In maintaining the principles behind the enactment of the FDCPA, we believe
a simpler and less confusing formulation of a standard designed to protect those
consumers of below-average sophistication or intelligence should be adopted. Thus,
we will use the term, "unsophisticated," instead of the phrase, "least sophisticated,"
to describe the hypothetical consumer whose reasonable perceptions will be used to
determine if collection messages are deceptive or misleading.
Under either test, however, conduct may be found to violate the FDCPA without
actual damages to the named plaintiff.
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connection with the collection of any debt." 79 Without limiting the
general application of the foregoing, the provision list 16 acts or
practices that are prima facie false, misleading or deceptive.
Significantly, the list of prohibited practices is expressly made
non-exclusive. This gives the courts the ability to determine whether
new or innovative practices that do not fit within the list of
prohibitions might still be false or misleading. This was shown in
Brown v. Card Service Center. In Card Service Center, the court
used this general prohibition, noting, "Though we express no opinion
as to whether the language of the CSC Letter constitutes a 'threat'
under § 1692e(5), we believe that the facts as alleged in Brown's
complaint, if proven, could render the CSC Letter a 'deceptive' or
'misleading' communication, in violation of § 1692e." The flexibility
of the FDCPA allows a court deciding a case under its provisions to
shape the law in a way that gives both consumers and debt collectors
notice of legal and prohibited practices. Published opinions, stare
decisis, and precedent ensure that the Act is applied consistently.
Arbitrators may also apply the FDCPA to new or innovative acts and
practices; however, they do so on an ad hoc basis. Because
arbitrators' decision are secret, and there often is no written opinion,
arbitrators will not know the decisions of other arbitrators and will
not be bound by such a decision even if do.
B. The FDCPA Needs Class Actions
Perhaps more than other consumer statutes, claims under the
FDCPA are often brought as a class action. Violations of the FDCPA
are often in the form of an act or practice which can be easy to prove,
and damages do not require proof of individual reliance. For
example, a violation could be a letter involving numerous consumers
with minor or no economic injury. The ability to recover without
proof of actual deception or reliance by individual consumers
makes FDCPA claims more appropriate for class action certification
and relief. The ability to recover attorneys' fees also provides the
incentive for filing the suit. Under a recent Supreme Court decision,
however, enforcing an arbitration clause between the consumer and
creditor will ultimately have the effect of eliminating consumer class
actions under the FDCPA.
In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,82 the Supreme Court
15 U.S.C. 1692e.
so Brown, 464 F.3d at 455.
I See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
8 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
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reviewed a consumer's challenge to a class action prohibition
contained in an arbitration clause. 83 The District Court, applying
California Law, felt compelled to decide the case based on the
California Supreme Court decision in Discover Bank v. Superior
Court. In Discover Bank, the court held that class action waivers are
unconscionable and unenforceable:
[W]hen the waiver is found in an consumer contract of
adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the
contacting parties predictably involve small amounts of
damages, and when it is alleged that the a party with
superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of
individually small sums of money, then, at least to the
extent the obligation at issue is governed by California
law, the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the
party from responsibility for [its] own fraud .

. .

. (Civ.

Code § 1668). Under these circumstances, such waivers
are unconscionable under California law and should not
be enforced.8 6
Relying on this rule, the district court invalidated the provision, and
ordered class-wide arbitration. The Ninth Circuit affirmed,8 8 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In its decision, the Court began by noting that its opinion
would "consider whether the FAA prohibits States from conditioning
the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the availability
Specifically, the Court
of classwide arbitration procedures."
The arbitration agreement required that claims be brought in the parties'
"individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class
or representative proceeding." That provision further stated, "the arbitrator may not
consolidate more than one person's claims, and may not otherwise preside over any
form of a representative or class proceeding." Jd. at 1762 n.2.
84 Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2008 WL 5216255 (S.D. Cal., Aug. 11,
2008).
85 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (2005).
83

8
87

Id. at 1110.

Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *9. The court noted, "The question presented,
therefore, is whether the arbitration provision now before the Court sufficiently
addresses the concerns of Discover Bank and provides an adequate substitute for
class litigation or arbitration. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes it
does not." Id.
Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009).
89 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
at 1744.
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examined whether California's Discover Bank rule could be used to
invalidate a class action waiver contained in an arbitration clause.
The majority recognized that the Discover Bank rule is a "ground[] . .
. for the revocation of any contract" under California law, and
appears to be within the scope of Section 2 of the FAA. But the Court
refused to give validity to state contract doctrines that were
inconsistent with the FAA itself. The Court stated, "Although §2's
saving clause preserves generally applicable contract defenses,
nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand
as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives." 90 The
Court concluded its analysis by finding that, "[b]ecause it 'stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Con fess,' California's Discover Bank rule is
preempted by the FAA.
By invalidating the application of the Discover Bank rule
because it interferes with the fundamental attributes of arbitration, the
Court authorized a business to both mandate arbitration and to
preclude a consumer from bringing or joining a class action.
Although the full scope and consequence of Concepcion currently is
being debated, few dispute the fact that it will substantially reduce the
ability to maintain or join a class action. As many have noted, the
decision in Concepcion substantially decreases or effectively
eliminates most consumer class actions.
The prohibition of class-wide relief in debt collection cases is
90 Id. at 1746.

91Id at 1753. "California's Discover Bank rule ... interferes with arbitration.

Although the rule does not require classwide arbitration, it allows any party to a
consumer contract to demand it ex post."
92 Although Concepcion may not absolutely preclude consumer class actions, it
is clear that the class action device is an endangered species. See generally, Myriam
E. Giles & Gary B. Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. (2012, forthcoming) ("Class
actions are on the ropes. Most class cases will not survive the impending tsunami of
class action waivers."); Frank Blechschmidt, Comment, All Alone in Arbitration:
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and the Substantive Impact of Class Action
Waivers, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 541 (2012) (class arbitrations will decrease, but not die
out completely; courts and Congress should reverse Concepcion); Jenna G.
Farleigh, Splitting the Baby: StandardizingIssue Class Certification, 64 VAND. L.
REv. 1585 (2011) ("[Concepcion] is not the death of the class action"); Sarah
Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration FairnessAct and the
Supreme Court's Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence,48 HOus. L. REv. 457 (2011)
("Considered together, Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion make clear that it will be the
rare case indeed where consumers will be able to obtain class.procedures if they are
bound to an arbitration agreement.").
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particularly onerous and will frustrate enforcement of the FDCPA. If
the FDCPA is enforced through private litigation, it requires an
incentive for attorneys to maintain such suits and sufficient remedies
to deter wrongful conduct. One of the most efficient ways the
FDCPA is utilized is through a class action. A class action can
effectively and efficiently deal with a large number of small claims,
and provide sufficient attorneys' fees as an incentive. Also, a class
action may be beneficial to the defendant, who can achieve a single
resolution of a common problem and avoid the additional time,
expense, and possible inconsistencies that could result from an
individual lawsuit. 93
Claims under the FDCPA are more appropriately handled
through a class action for four reasons. First, many cases involve
insignificant damages. Second, the class is often easily identifiable.
Third, the statutory violation is easily susceptible to proof Finally,
the strict liability nature of the Act eliminates the problem of
individual issues that would preclude class certification. For example,
whether a letter sent to hundreds or thousands of consumers is
misleading or deceptive may be established in one action, with a
statutory cap on damages. Precluding class actions through an
arbitration provision could have one of two results. Adversely
affected consumers may maintain individual arbitrations, which have
the potential of inconsistent results, multiple statutory damages and
attorneys' fees; or, individual consumers will find arbitration too time
consuming and costly and will simply fail to take any action. In other
words, either debt collectors may face substantial additional time,
expense, and inconsistent results, or the FDCPA may go unenforced
because of the inefficiencies of arbitration.

III. CONCLUSION
For the FDCPA to remain a statute that relies upon private
litigation as the primary means of enforcement and interpretation,
both short term and long term solutions are needed. In the short term,
courts should strictly interpret the language of agreements between
consumers and businesses against enforcing arbitration with nonparties and cautiously apply estoppel.
By its very nature, equitable estoppel involves questions of
93 The FDCPA protects the collector from excessive damages in class action
by limiting recovery to "such amount as the court may allow for all other class
members, without regard to a mini- mum individual recovery, not to exceed the
lesser of $500,000 or I per centum of the net worth of the debt collector." Civil
Liability, 15 U.S.C.A § 1692k(a)(2)(B)(ii).
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equity and fairness, often providing the court with substantial
discretion. As the court noted in Sokol Holdings, Inc. v. BMB Munai,
Inc.,94 equitable estoppel does not mean that whenever a relationship
of any kind may be found among the parties to a dispute and their
dispute deals with the subject matter of an arbitration contract made
by one of them, that party will be estopped from refusing to arbitrate:
[T]here must be a relationship among the parties of a
nature that justifies a conclusion that the party which
agreed to arbitrate with another entity should be estopped
from denying an obligation to arbitrate a similar dispute
with the adversary which is not a party to the arbitration
agreement.9 5
Similarly, contract interpretation issues often hinge on the
parties' intent and expectations. Consumers do not expect that an
adhesion contract signed with a business bars them from going to
court when a totally unrelated party violates our federal debt
collection laws. The strong federal policy in favor of arbitration is
designed to enforce the parties' agreement, not to extend that
agreement beyond the intent of a reasonable person, and not in a
manner that frustrates the application of the FDCPA.
The FAA recognizes that arbitration is a creature of contract,
and the agreement of the parties controls most issues with respect to
whether to arbitrate, the scope of the arbitration clause, and to whom
it applies. As discussed above, courts look first to the language of the
agreement to determine if the parties intended the arbitration
provision to apply to non-parties. Looking to the language of the
agreement is an appropriate approach unless the language does not
express the parties' intent, or the provision is inconsistent with the
legislative intent of the FAA and any other relevant statute,
particularly the FDCPA.
When parties of relatively equal bargaining strength negotiate
terms, the terms should be applied as agreed. However, terms in an
agreement between a business, such as a bank or credit card
company, and a consumer are drafted solely by the business and
94 Sokol Holdings, Inc. v. BMB Munai, Inc., 542 F.3d 354, 359 (2d Cir.
2008).
9 Id. After carefully reviewing the facts, the court concluded that, "Given the
present facts, there is no basis for finding either that Sokol consented to arbitrate
with BMB, or that there would be unfairness in allowing Sokol to refuse to arbitrate
with BMB on the ground that BMB was not a party to Sokol's arbitration
agreement." Id. at 362.
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presented to the consumer on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. This does
not mean that all such clauses are unenforceable, or that the language
should not be applied as part of the agreement. As the Supreme Court
recognized in Concepcion, "the times in which consumer contracts
were anything other than adhesive are long past," 96 and no one would
propose a blanket invalidity of consumer contracts of adhesion. On
the other hand, contracts between a consumer and a creditor
containing provisions that will control the consumer's rights vis-a-vis
a non-party debt collector are different. Courts should not presume
that a consumer who contracted to purchase goods or borrow money
intended to waive his or her right to go to court against such parties,
in the event that they violate a federal law, designed to protect the
consumer against wrongful debt collection practices by a third party
collector.
Both statutory interpretation and equitable estoppel, the two
most common theories used to allow a non-party debt collector to
impose arbitration, enable courts to consider the nature of the parties,
the language of the agreement, and the objectives and goals of the
statutory rights being asserted. Courts should exercise this discretion
in a manner that allows the FDCPA to remain a "self-enforcing
statute," resulting in consistent and fair rules.
This short-term solution, however, is at best a pyrrhic victory.
Arbitration clauses are drafted by the business, presented to the
consumer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, with no meaningful
negotiation. Even if courts strictly construe such clauses with a
presumption of non-applicability to a non-party, each opinion
provides a road-map of what was wrong with the clause and usually
how it could be corrected. It is only a matter of time until courts
establish exactly what boilerplate language is sufficient to make the
arbitration provision enforceable against nonparties.
The only meaningful way to prevent the continued growth of
arbitration and the degeneration of consumers' rights under the
FDCPA is through a change in federal law - namely an amendment
to the Federal Arbitration Act. 97 The simplest change is to preclude
96 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, at 1750 (2011).
9
I recognize that the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
has the authority to regulate pre-dispute arbitration agreements and could take
action that would ban such agreement. The Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5518 (2010), provides, "The Bureau shall
conduct a study of, and shall provide a report to Congress concerning, the use of
agreements providing for arbitration of any future dispute between covered persons
and consumers in connection with the offering or providing of consumer financial
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pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts from extending
to non-party disputes, and permit parties to agree to arbitration only
after a dispute has arisen and they have considered other alternatives.
A more meaningful reform would be the Arbitration Fairness Act of
2011,98 which would prohibit forced arbitration in all consumer
contracts and make it illegal for employers to force arbitration on
their employees. The Act states in relevant part:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2011"
SECTION 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The Federal Arbitration Act (now enacted as
chapter 1 of title 9 of the United States Code) was
intended to apply to disputes between commercial entities
of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power.
(2) A series of decisions by the Supreme Court of
the United States have changed the meaning of the Act so
that it now extends to consumer disputes and
employment disputes.
(3) Most consumers and employees have little or
no meaningful choice whether to submit their claims to
arbitration. Often, consumers and employees are not even
aware that they have given up their rights.
(4) Mandatory arbitration undermines the
development of public law because there is inadequate
transparency and inadequate judicial review of
arbitrators' decisions.
(5) Arbitration can be an acceptable alternative
when consent to the arbitration is truly voluntary, and
occurs after the dispute arises.

products or services." While I encourage and applaud any such action, it would not
eliminate the problem discussed in this article. The CFPB regulates only consumer
financial products and services. See § 5531. Debt collectors often collect debt
arising from a much wider variety of transactions.
" S. 987, 112th Cong. §§ 1-3, 401 (2011).
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SECTION 3. ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT,
CONSUMER, AND CIVIL RIGHTS DISPUTES.
(a) In General- Title 9 of the United States Code
is amended by adding at the end the following:
4-ARBITRATION
CHAPTER
AND
CONSUMER,
EMPLOYMENT,
RIGHTS DISPUTES

OF
CIVIL

Sec. 401. Definitions
In this chapter(1) the term "civil rights dispute" means a
dispute(A) arising under(i) the Constitution of the United States or the
constitution of a State; or
(ii) a Federal or State statute that prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, disability,
religion, national origin, or any invidious basis in
public
credit, housing,
education, employment,
accommodations and facilities, voting, or program
funded or conducted by the Federal Government or State
government, including any statute enforced by the Civil
Rights Division of the Department of Justice and any
statute enumerated in section 62(e) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to unlawful
discrimination); and
(B) in which at least 1 party alleging a violation
of the Constitution of the United States, a State
constitution, or a statute prohibiting discrimination is an
individual;
(2) the term "consumer dispute" means a dispute
between an individual who seeks or acquires real or
personal property, services (including services relating to
securities and other investments), money, or credit for
personal, family, or household purposes and the seller or
provider of such property, services, money, or credit;
(3) the term "employment dispute" means a
dispute between an employer and employee arising out of
the relationship of employer and employee as defined in
section 3 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29
U.S.C. 203); and
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(4) the term "predispute arbitration agreement"
means any agreement to arbitrate a dispute that had not
yet arisen at the time of the making of the agreement.
Sec. 402. Validity and enforceability
(a) In General- Notwithstanding any other
provision of this title, no predispute arbitration agreement
shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an
employment dispute, consumer dispute, or civil rights
dispute.
(b) Applicability(1) IN GENERAL- An issue as to whether this
chapter applies to an arbitration agreement shall be
determined under Federal law. The applicability of this
chapter to an agreement to arbitrate and the validity and
enforceability of an agreement to which this chapter
applies shall be determined by a court, rather than an
arbitrator, irrespective of whether the party resisting
arbitration challenges
the arbitration agreement
specifically or in conjunction with other terms of the
contract containing such agreement.
(2)
COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS- Nothing in this chapter shall apply to
any arbitration provision in a contract between an
employer and a labor organization or between labor
organizations, except that no such arbitration provision
shall have the effect of waiving the right of an employee
to seek judicial enforcement of a right arising under a
provision of the Constitution of the United States, a State
constitution, or a Federal or State statute, or public policy
arising therefrom.

